Japan’s “Asset Owner Principles”: A Step Forward, But More is Needed

(Translation-) I support Japan’s new Asset Owner Principles, but am a little disappointed that they are weak. It seems clear that one of the major purposes is to urge asset owners to sign the Stewardship Code (SC), which they should be doing already. But even that request is weak: “When fulfilling stewardship responsibilities, asset owners should consider accepting Japan’s Stewardship Code and then take actions in accordance with the Code, based on the size of their AUM and capabilities.” I would have hoped for stronger language, at least for pension funds. (Something have been suggesting since 2016. See below.)

And even though the Principles are not binding and do not more strongly ask asset owners to sign the Stewardship Code, they do not mention or clarify that overseeing their fund managers’ voting activities is one of their responsibilities, included in their fiduciary duties.

Aptly Titled, a Great Book to Read About “Whither Japan?”

This being New Year’s Day, I will recommend one book to read in 2024 to learn about not only about the challenges that Japan faces, but how the country is evolving to cope with them (and even thrive) in the global economy.  Richard hits the nail on the head in many ways, but to summarize a major theme;  if Japan is to fare better during next 15years than its past 25 years would seem to indicate, it will not be because the business models and management thinking of  its large firms are simply updated.

Taro Kono, Could You Please Speak to the FSA and TSE?

The FSA and TSE have been assiduous in encouraging more engagement between investors and Japanese companies, and in highlighting the problems raised by the ever-increasing share of funds invested on a passive basis in the Japanese market – which is leading to a sort of “hollowing out” of meaningful feedback from institutional investors.  I would encourage anyone who reads Japanese to read the most recent Action Plan for corporate governance, especially including the reports by the Secretariat in the FSA’s May 16th meeting.  This is very commendable.

On the other hand, there is a stark contradiction between this stance and a big defect in the machine-readability of the Corporate Governance Reports (CG Reports)  submitted by Japanese companies to the JPX/TSE, which is regulated by the FSA . The defect renders a major portion of these reports almost entirely useless for rigorous analysis by computers… even though I pointed  it out some six years ago. In a word, the 11 (or more) different “disclosure items” required to included in CG Reports, which account for close to half of the meaningful information in each report, are all mashed together into one XBRL “barrel” that does not even have a standardized format.

Webinar: “Using High-Dimensional Corporate Governance Variables to Predict Firm Performance in Japan”

On June 13th, join us for a discussion showing the future of corporate governance analysis.  In this webinar we will introduce the results of leading-edge academic research to determine whether corporate governance practices and firm characteristics can be used to predict firm performance over the short-, mid-, and long-term. Earlier attempts at this research have always come with limitations or been focused narrowly on certain practices, but using BDTI’s detailed database focusing on Japanese corporate governance practices and important characteristics of all listed firms in Japan, researchers have been able to conclude that certain corporate governance practices and facts should be of interest to every investor.

METRICAL: CG Stock Performance (Japan): December 2022

The stock market ended December with a sharp decline after the Bank of Japan announced operational revisions to its interest rate operations at its monetary policy meeting. The CG Top20 stocks underperformed both the TOPIX and JPX400 for the second month in a row.

December stock market was unable to find a sense of direction until the middle of the month as investors watched the monetary policy of the U.S. FOMC meeting. The stock market fell sharply immediately after the Bank of Japan decided to expanded the range of the long-term interest rates from 0.25% to 0.5% at its monetary policy meeting on December 20. After that, stocks closed lower with no sign of a rebound. While bank stocks rose sharply in response to the interest rate hike, notable declines were seen in other stocks, especially growth stocks.
The TOPIX and JPX400 indexes fell -4.79% and -4.87%, respectively, in December performance. The CG Top20 stock index underperformed against both indices, falling -5.59%. Over the long term since 2014, the CG Top20 continues to outperform both indices by about 2% per year. The CG Top 20 stocks have been revised on July 1. The new components are listed in the table below.

METRICAL:Reason Behind the Difference in Management Between Family Companies and Others Is the Shareholding

On October 14, the Nikkei Shimbun published an article titled “The Magnetism of “Founder’s Family Companies with Reverse Strategies”: Aggressive Even in a Crisis, Corporate Governance is an Issue.” I would like to think about the points discussed in the article.

The October 14 Nikkei article outlined the following report.
Founding family companies that did not flinch in the face of the crisis and moved to a “reverse strategy” are attracting investors. Companies that made quick management decisions and expanded store openings during the COVID-19 pandemic have been unique in the stock market because of the explosive power of their earnings recovery. Weak governance, which has been a longstanding issue, has also been addressed, and money is flocking to companies that are ahead of the curve.

The Nikkei Stock Average rebounded sharply in the Tokyo market on October 14, ending the day 853 yen higher than the previous day. Compared to the end of last year, it was 6% lower. The market environment remained nervous due to strong concerns about continued U.S. interest rate hikes and economic recession. One company that has seen its share price rise steadily and more than double its appreciation rate is TKP, a major rental meeting room company. In FY02/2021, when face-to-face events decreased due to the Corona disaster, the company fell into the red for the first time since its listing. While reducing fixed costs such as personnel expenses and rent, the company remained on the offensive behind the scenes. The company aggressively purchased prime properties that were undervalued. This “reverse management strategy” is now bearing fruit. With the lifting of restrictions on activities, demand has returned, and the company is back in the black for the March-August period of 2022 for the first time in 3 years. President Takateru Kono, speaking at the October 13 financial results briefing, enthusiastically stated, “We will not only rent out space, but also provide content (such as distribution services) to increase added value.”

Why Leaders Must Adapt To Evolving ESG Demands

By Helle Bank Jorgensen, CEO of Competent Boards

Earlier this year, I took part in a fascinating session with the World Economic Forum as part of the New Champion Dialogues 2022 series. Hosted by Olivier Schwab, Managing Director at WEF, I was joined by Anushka Bogdanov, Chair and founder of Risk Insights and Jason Jay, Senior Director at MIT Sloan School of Management. 

The discussion focused on the rapidly changing picture of environmental, social and governance (ESG) requirements for companies as they come under increasing pressure from stock markets to provide transparent, measurable and comparable data on their activities. 

And let’s not forget pressure from employees, suppliers, customers and other societal stakeholders. ESG risks and opportunities are a fast-moving field, with new regulations and expectations coming thick and fast. 

It starts and ends with the board of directors

For companies that want to effectively adapt to these evolving ESG requirements, including climate change, that process must start and end with the board of directors. ESG and climate change are areas where board directors cannot provide oversight if they don’t have the insight.

Redesigning Corporations: Incentives Matter

By Nicholas Benes
(also published in the Harvard Law School Forum on Corporate Governance) 

The Birth of the Corporation: Public Interest Organizations

The evolution of the modern corporation is the fascinating story of a series of self-serving legal and societal mutations over hundreds of years, which have morphed the original concept and endowed corporations with freedom of activity, rights, and limitations on liability that would shock their original “inventors”.

As we all know, for many years most corporations were established by way of an exceptional “charter” by a sovereign, granted only in specific cases where: (a) large amounts of capital were needed (b) to conduct investments and activities that served public or national interests and had good profit potential, but (c) where the risks were so large that few parties would invest if their risk were not shared with many others and/or limited to the amount of money they invested.

In the 1600s and 1700s, the activities that sovereign nations felt met those requirements were the exploration of foreign lands on the other side of the globe, the creation and administration of colonies there, and conducting lucrative trade on long (and dangerous) sea routes to and from those colonies. Thus, the most well-known early corporations include organizations such as the British East India Company (the original “too-big-to-fail company), The Dutch East India Company, the Hudson’s Bay Company, and companies to construct the Erie Canal.

As the industrial revolution gathered steam, the need to raise large amounts of capital increased many times over. Driven by this need, the immense benefits of corporate status for raising financing became increasingly obvious and desirable to investors and managers: easy stock transferability vs. rewriting partnership agreements, separation of ownership from control, legal personhood that simplified large transactions such as loans and large investments (a single counterparty to deal with and sue), and the possibility of receiving a charter that conferred “limited liability” on shareholders. All of these made it much easier to raise funds in large amounts than any other form of business organization.

Message to JR Kyushu Shareholders

Fir Tree Partners submitted a shareholder proposal nominating me as an outside board director for JR Kyushu. This all began as Fir Tree, the largest and longest holding, active shareholder of JR Kyushu since its IPO, was working in dialogue with the Company to find suitable new board candidates. I accepted the nomination because I believe the current needs of the JR Kyushu board fit well with my previous professional experience as well as my knowledge base. In particular, my experience as both analyst and corporate executive should be helpful as I am in favor of dialogue between investors and companies.

In mid-April, I was surprised to learn that JR Kyushu management, after spending months screening and interviewing the various candidates, ultimately decided to reject all candidates that were under consideration with Fir Tree. At this time, Fir Tree asked us to be their shareholder candidates for this year’s annual meeting. Even though being elected to a board as a shareholder proposal candidate is still rare in Japan, I decided to accept the role because I feel strongly about the importance of good governance and the role of completely independent outside directors. As I learned more about JR Kyushu in the past few months, I have concluded that I can add to the JR Kyushu board the diversity, perspective, and expertise that I have developed as an analyst, fund manager, investor relations professional and corporate executive in charge of governance matters. To this end, I believe I can help JR Kyushu in addressing the current challenges caused by Covid-19 as well as fulfill its full potential.

I would also like to publicly state that I am completely independent from Fir Tree and have told them directly that at all times. Fir Tree approached me through the help of a third-party search firm. I previously knew nobody at Fir Tree. There is no financial arrangement between us. I will remain independent from Fir Tree should I be elected as a director of JR Kyushu. I will consider Fir Tree’s opinions as no more or less important than those of any other shareholder, large or small.

If elected to the JR Kyushu board, I would be completely open minded and unbiased. I would review all board matters carefully in consultation with the other board members, management, and shareholders utilizing both public and non-public information in order to form my own opinions. I would endeavor to make well informed decisions that are best for all stakeholders.