Abstract: Japan’s high corporate savings might be holding back growth. We focus on the causes andconsequences of the current corporate behavior and suggest options for reform. In particular,Japan’s weak corporate governance—as measured by available indexes—might becontributing to high cash holdings. Our empirical analysis on a panel of Japanese firms
Author: Admin
IMF: To “Unstash The Cash” in Japan, Corporate Governance Reform Needed
Abstract – ”Japan’s high corporate savings might be holding back growth. We focus on the causes and consequences of the current corporate behavior and suggest options for reform.
Japan Appoints a High-Quality Panel to Advise on its New Corporate Governance Code
Japan has appointed a high-quality panel to advise on the core principles of its corporate governance code. The panel include an experienced foreign board member, Scott Callon, and severalcorporate governance advocates. As well, Mats Isakkson from the OECD will serve as an advisor.
http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/councils/corporategovernance/01.pdf
“Does Board Independence Improve Firm Performance? Outcome of a Quasi-Natural Experiment”
Abstract: Since 2003 the Australian Securities Exchange Corporate Governance Council (ASX) has required that all listed firms either adopt a majority of “independent” board members without links either to management or to substantial shareholders (i.e., 5% or greater shareholding) or “if not, why not”.
“Board Self-Evaluations: Practical and Legal Implications”
(Introduction) – The NYSE mandates that the boards of listed companies undertake an annual self-evaluation to determine whether they and each of their committees are functioning effectively. While Nasdaq does not impose similar requirements, companieslisted on this exchange, as a matter of good governance, often undertake thisperformance review.
Paper: “Gender Diversity and Securities Fraud”
Abstract: We formulate theory and set forth a first-ever empirical analysis of the impact of board of director gender diversity on the broad spectrum of securities fraud, generating three main insights. First, the examined data show strong evidence consistent with the view that the importance of women on boards in mitigating securities fraud lies in the mechanism of diversity itself, such that the optimalpercentage of women on boards is 50% with respect to minimizing securities fraud.
Paper: “C” Is for Crucible: Behavioral Ethics, Culture, and the Board’s Role in Csuite Compliance
Paper: “C” Is for Crucible: Behavioral Ethics, Culture, and the Board's Role in Csuite Compliance, by Scott Killingsworth –
Nishimura & Asahi’s Memos on Various Squeeze-Out Methods in Japan, Some of Them New
New Method to Squeezing Out Minority Shareholders (July 2014)
http://bdti.mastertree.jp/f/h9qxszrb
Squeezing Out Minority Shareholders (prior memo)
http://bdti.mastertree.jp/f/rm1vkyl5
Japan’s Formal Growth Strategy: Translation of Sections on Major Corporate Governance Reforms
The Japaneese government hasnot translated major portions of its Revised Growth Strategy intoEnglish yet, so The Board Director Training Institute of Japan (BDTI)recently translated the partsthat relateto reform of corporate governance. As you will note, among other things Japan has committed to produce:
NY Times: “Investors to Directors: ‘Can We Talk?7”
(From the article) What if lawmakers never spoke to their constituents?
Oddly enough, that’s exactly how corporate America operates. Shareholders vote for directors, but the directors rarely, if ever, communicate with them.