Abstract: We use an observable action (non-executive directors’ insider trading) and an observable outcome (the market assessment of a board-ratified merger) to infer collusion between a firm’s executive and non-executive directors. We show that CEOs are more likely to be retained when both directors and CEOs sell abnormal amounts of equity before the delinquent accounting […]
…..Unfortunately the voting policies of the proxy advisory firms are usually derived from unsupported notions of what constitutes “good governance” and are often applied in ways that do not account for the specific circumstances at many companies. Accordingly, this approach often fails to advance the real interests of long-term investors…..
By Paul T. Friedman and Ruti Smithline (Morrison Foerster update)
(Abstract) – Do bankruptcy changes in the institutional environment affect the rate of founding by particular types of founders and the performance of their ventures?
This guide aims to assist board members of publicly held banks, BHCs, and other financial services companies — and of nonfinancial publicly held corporations — in designing, developing, and operating a board-level risk committee. Dodd-Frank1 and the NPR will soon require such committees for certain BHCs.
Regulators in the United States are writing rules to implement the Dodd-Frank legislation, including rules that will determine how broadly the law will apply to activity outside the United States. Japanese and other foreign financial institutions should take advantage of this opportunity to influence the regulations, because the consequences will be very important to them, and change will be much easier to accomplish now than it will be in the future.
On December 7, 2011, Nicholas Benes (Representative Director of BDTI) gave a lecture at the Temple University Japan Campus on the above topic. The speech can be viewed at this link:
The presentation materials may be downloaded by registered users of BDTI's Discussion Forum,in the data library at:
The TSE has kindly prepared a translation of the interim proposal by the MOJ with respect to amendment of the Company Law of Japan, which is now up for public comment until the end of January.As readers probably know, the incumbentDPJ party initially started this third amendment process in 10 years with the goal of improviing corporate governance.
Instructions for Public Comment: http://bit.ly/yFGtih